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MITIGATION: AN OUTLINE OF LAW, METHOD AND STRATEGY
BY: PETER T. HANSEN
Introduction
After the conclusion of the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial,
and the defendant has been found guilty of an offense qualifying him to be
sentenced to death, the second crucial portion of the trial commences: the
penalty phase. It is during the penalty phase that defense counsel must
present evidence sufficient in the mind of the jury to spare the defendant.
At this stage of the trial, the defendant's situation is serious. Counsel must
maximize remaining evidence and take the "last chance" to save the
defendant's life. The preparation for this "last chance", however, should
begin early.
Three distinct areas must be thoroughly prepared for the penalty
phase to succeed. They are: learning and becoming familiar with the law
of mitigation; collecting information and developing a theory of mitiga-
tion; and assembling the evidence in a way that explains, but not excuses,
what the defendant did.
Although no "foolproof' methods of presenting mitigation exist,
this article seeks to present some concepts that have been utilized effec-
tively to achieve non-capital dispositions of death penalty cases. Though
not directly addressed here, it is worthwhile to mention that many of the
techniques discussed in this article are equally, if not more profitable in
plea negotiations.
The Law of Mitigation
Federal Requirements
A discussion of the law of the penalty phase of a capital trial from
the defendant's viewpoint may begin with a definition of mitigation.
Broadly defined, mitigation is anything that makes it less likely for the jury
to sentence the defendant to death. The polestar mitigation case is Lockett
v. OhioI, in which the Court enunciated the well known rule "the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest
kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death."'2 The Court also stated that the sentencer must
be able to give effect to the mitigating evidence that is presented:
[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases
from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of
the defendant's character and record and to circumstances
of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that
the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty. 3
The Lockett directive was expanded in Eddings v. Oklahoma.
4
Eddings dealt with the case of a sixteen year-old male who was sentenced
to death for the murder of a police officer. Eddings forbids limitations
which prohibit the sentencer from considering and giving weight to
mitigating evidence through the operation of statutes and evidentiary rules.
The Court stated: "Just as the state may not by statute preclude the
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neithermay the sentencer
refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating factor." 5 The
Court added specifically: "We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute
permits the defendant to present evidence 'as to any mitigating circumstances.'
Lockett requires the sentencer to listen.'"6 The Supreme Court stated categori-
cally that the defendant's troubled background, including his psychological
impairments, parental divorce, the possibility that his mother was a prostitute,
mental limitations, history of parental abuse, and possibility of treatment were
all relevant. 7 Eddings is both precedent and guide to what information is
"relevant" to the mitigation case.8
Additional cases from the federal system provide other directions
to counsel on mitigation issues. Skipper v. South Carolina9 holds that
favorable adjustment to incarceration can be considered as a mitigating
factor. Hitchcock v. Dugger 0 mentions the size and occupation of the
petitioner's family, the death of defendant's father, and the fact that he had
been a good uncle. McKoy v. North CarolinaII highlighted old age as a
mitigating factor, as well as several decades of untreated emotional defect,
and that this was aggravated by poor health. Peny v. Lynaugh 12holds that
evidence of mental retardation and child abuse is mitigating. The Peny
Court added that sentencers must be able to give effect to any mitigating
evidence regardless of the existence of aggravating factors.
13
Recent decisions have added some new considerations to mitiga-
tion evidence. A basic change in the landscape of penalty trials occurred
with the 1991 case Payne v. Tennessee.14 The Supreme Court overruled
two previous cases which held that statements regarding the impact of the
crime on the victim's survivors are irrelevant to the culpability of the
defendant. The Court in Payne stated that victim impact evidence levels
the playing field by offsetting the unlimited ability the defendant has to
present evidence in mitigation. Defense counsel henceforth must prepare
for the introduction of such evidence and be prepared either to rebut what
is offered or deflect its impact by additional evidence.
At present, the law of the Commonwealth is more restrictive than
the federal system. Payne, while allowing states to consider victim impact
statements, does not require consideration, and the states are free to admit
or not admit them as their courts and legislatures decide. Virginia Code §
19.2-264.4(C) is clear that the only relevant factors supporting a sentence
of death are vileness of the crime and likelihood of future dangerousness
of the defendant. These factors relate only to the culpability of the
defendant, and are expressly directed to his conduct in committing the
offense. Additionally, Dingus v. Commonwealth15 holds that feelings of
sympathy for the victims of crime are irrelevant in determining guilt or
innocence. Because the purpose of the capital sentence is in itself a finding
of extra culpability and communal outrage at the crime, 16 Dingus is
applicable to the penalty phase of a capital trial. The Supreme Court of
Virginia has recently indicated a possible willingness to abandon this rule.
In George v. Commonwealth,17 the court cited Payne v. Tennessee,18
which sustained the admission of a victim impact statement:
[A] state may properly conclude that for the jury to assess
meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blame-
worthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase
evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant. 19
Despite the favorable citation, however, the George court did not specifi-
cally adopt Payne in Virginia, and whether the traditional rule will be
altered remains for future cases to decide. Also of note is Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion in Walton v.Arizona.20 Justice Scalia announced there
his intention to follow no longer the rule set forth in Lockett and Woodson
v. North Carolina.21 He reasoned that the constitutional requirement to
untrammel the sentencer's freedom to consider mitigation evidence in the
aforementioned cases is irreconcilable with Furman v. Georgia's22 re-
quirement that the sentencer's ability to vote death be narrowed by guiding
the sentencer's discretion.
Mitigation law in Virginia
The law of mitigation in Virginia derives from statute.23 Consid-
eration of mitigating factors cannot be limited to those listed in the statute,
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however.24 The enumerated mitigating factors are simply those that have
been expressly recognized for consideration by the legislature. Virginia
Code § 19.2-264.4(B) states:
Evidence which may be admissible... may include the
circumstance surrounding the offense, the history and
background of the defendant, and any other facts in miti-
gation of the offense.
Although the statute mentions mitigating factors separately, the
defense is permitted the same latitude as provided in Lockett. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals construed Virginia Code § 19.2-264 inBriley v.
Bass:
A list of five non-exclusive mitigating circumstances ap-
pears in the statute, but the defense is permitted to intro-
duce any evidence relevant to the penalty decision, includ-
ing"the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history
and background of the defendant, and any other facts in
mitigation of the offense." 25
The statute then continues to enumerate six specific examples of
what is considered as mitigating: no significant prior criminal history;
felony committed while defendant was underextrememental or emotional
disturbance; the victim participated in the defendants's conduct or con-
sented to the conduct in some way; at the time of the felony the defendant's
capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of his conduct or his ability to
conform to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired; the age
of the defendant; and mental retardation of the defendant.
26
Several of these statutory mitigating factors deserve further com-
ment. The factor which looks at extreme emotional disturbance seems to
be related to the crime of passion defense, which could negate premedita-
tion and reduce a homicide to second degree murder. If the defendant
committed the offense in fear or anger brought on by some type of trauma,
this could be invoked as a defense. This factor was unsuccessfully urged
in the case of Savino v. Commonwealth,27 in which the defendant killed his
homosexual lover in "what can only be described as a crime of passion
comparable to a domestic killing arising out of an extremely intense
personal relationship between [the victim and defendant]".
28
The statutory mitigating factor which addresses extreme emo-
tional disturbance might also be demonstrated with evidence similar to that
which would be proffered when making a defense of heat of passion upon
sudden and adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. The
difference would be, however, that sudden and adequate provocation
would not be required. The provocation prong, while not included in the
extreme emotional disturbance factor, is implicated in the factor that
inquires into the victim's consent or involvement in the crime. Evidence
that demonstrates that the victim provoked or enraged the defendant or put
him in such jeopardy to the extent that the defendant thought it necessary
to kill would probably be relevant to proving the existence of this factor.
Perhaps this mitigating factor will become important to capital cases under
the new "drug transaction" statute.
The final two statutory mitigating factors, concerning mental
illness and mental retardation respectively, are areas of mitigation law that
are worthy of study in their own right and are extremely complex. A
common error that is made in this area is confusing the two, when in fact
they are quite different. Essentially, mental illness in Virginia is most often
seen in assertions ofthe insanity defense under the common law M'Naghten
standard. 29 Establishment of the mitigating factor again requires the use
of the insanity defense. Ability to appreciate the criminality must only be
"impaired," not completely eliminated. Impairment of ability to conform
conduct to law is added, and the requirement that the source of the
impairment be a recognized mental disease or defect is eliminated. Care
should be taken, however, when the source of the impairment is not a
recognized mental illness. Drug use that cause substantial impairment, for
example, will probably be construed as aggravating.
Two kinds of diminished capacity exist in Virginia. The first,
discussed above, is based on M'Naghten, and is a re-casting of the
traditional common law defense of insanity. The second is based upon an
"irresistible impulse" defense. The irresistible impulse defense would
frequently be urged by a defendant who was under the influence of drugs
or alcohol (or both) at thetime of the commission of the felony. In Virginia,
at least in the arena of capital defense, this defense has not met with great
success in terms of mitigation. The current status of a diminished capacity
mitigation can be gleaned from several cases from the previous decade. In
Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 30 the defendant committed capital murder
while under the influence of alcohol, tranxene, and LSD. The defendant
was also an alcoholic, and introduced expert psychiatric testimony at trial
that the combination of these drugs with the defendant's personality
disorders and alcoholism could produce explosive violence. The court
found the defendant capable of intent, and the sentencer apparently gave
no effect to the evidence, for it sentenced Fitzgerald to death.
The second case which demonstrates the unwillingness of Virginia
to accept diminished capacity as a mitigating factor is Giarratano 1'.
Commonwealth.3 1 There, the defendant was under the influence of
cocaine, large amounts of the drug Dilaudid, was alcoholic and was, at a
minimum, seriously mentally disturbed. The court stated:
[The defendant] contends that the court below confused
the statutory standards of § 19.2-264.4, supra, relating to
mental disturbance and impaired capacity, with the legal
test for insanity at the time of the offense. Hepointsoutthat
facts in mitigation of punishment need not rise to the level
required to prove defendant insane and argues that the trial
court did not assign "proper weight to the evidence of
defendant's mental state at the time of the commission of
the offenses." Defendant concludes that the reasonable
and just sentence, if the conviction is affirmed, is more
properly life in the penitentiary rather than death. We do
not agree.
32
The final comment on diminished capacity receptiveness that
defense counsel is likely to encounter in the array is shown in the following
colloquy reported in Levasseur v. Commonwealth:
[Counsel for defense]: I woudassume... you are opposed to
drugs, the use of illegal drugs. Do you have any bias or
prejudicethatwould makeyou unableto consider the usageby
the defendant, of illegal drugs, as part of his defense?...
[Venirewoman]: I think so.
The Court: You would be able to consider it or -
[Venirewoman]: I would be against the use of drugs ....
The Court: The fact that he might have used.., illegal drugs,
could you consider that as part of his defense?
[Venirewoman]: No.
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I have a motion.
The Court: Motion is denied.
33
Tangent to mental illness is mental retardation. Mental retardation
has been defined as
significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits
in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period.
34
If the capital defendant is mentally retarded, this should be a central theme
in the mitigation case. It is compelling as mitigation because retardation
is not the fault of the defendant, it is permanent, it cannot be falsified, and
because it impairs the ability of the defendant to recognize options when
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under stress.35 As Pemy indicates, however, mental retardation can be a
two-edged sword because it can indicate future dangerousness by demon-
strating that the defendant is unable to learn from the past. Mitigation
evidence should accordingly be presented in a way that maximizes
information showing the potential for improvement within the penal
institution.
The Virginia courts have in fact occasionally excluded certain
evidence from being considered as mitigation, in spite of Lockett. The
court in Coppola v. Connonwealth36 precluded the defendant from
entering evidence of the humiliating effect of his incarceration on his
children. The same court approved admission of evidence of a good
previous record. The Coppola court also precluded evidence that his co-
defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the same capital murder.
The court stated:
[Olur Court is required to consider and determine whether
the sentence ofdeath is excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, but no such responsibil-
ity upon the jury in the trial court. The jury, in the
sentencing phase of the trial, is required to consider evi-
dence in mitigation of the offense relevant to the defendant's
past record and the nature of his conduct in committing the
crime. Evidence as to the result of another defendant's trial
for the same crime is irrelevant to the determination by the
jury of the appropriate punishment for the defendant
whose sentence is being weighed.
37
Evidence regarding defendant's concern over his ability to adjust
to Lorton penitentiary has been held inadmissible on relevancy grounds in
Mackall v. Connionwealth.38 The defendant in this case had expressed his
concern that he would be influenced by the wrong crowd in the prison. The
same court also stated that in order for hearsay statements concerning the
defendant's hallucinations by his psychologist to come in, she would have
had to use the statements as a basis for her opinion as to the overall
diagnosis of the defendant. Attorneys will find it worthwhile to advise
psychiatrists to be clear in stating that all statements made by the defendant
to them are considered and relied upon in arriving at a diagnosis on which
a subsequent opinion is expressed at trial. In this manner the requirements
of evidentiary procedure may be satisfied, and the mitigation evidence
made a part of the record. The court also refused to consider the reaction
of the defendant's formerparole officerwhen he heard about the defendant's
arrest for murder. The court noted that no proffer of what the evidence
would have been was made. The prompting of the court should henceforth
be heeded, and regardless of the ruling, counsel should proffer what the
evidence will show for the record.
Jury consideration of mitigation law in Virginia is also hampered
by statutory verdict forms. The forms are set out in Va. Code § 19.2-264
(D)(1) - (2). Nowhere are the statutory mitigating factors mentioned. The
vileness factor and the future dangerousness factor are mentioned specifi-
cally, however, in the first instruction choice. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has held that it is not a violation of the Constitution
to make no instruction on the finding of statutory mitigation factors in
Clo-za v. Murrtay.39 The effect of this is to force counsel to stress the law
in their closing arguments of the mitigation phase because no mention will
be made in the forms. It is noteworthy also that the Virginia Supreme
Court, in LaVassuer v. Commonwealth40 has held it no violation that a
judge failed to give a specific instruction drawing the jury's attention to the
mitigation evidence. There, the court upheld an instruction directing that
if one or both the vileness and aggravating factor were proved, the jury
"nay fix the punishment at death; but if they believed from all the evidence
that the death penalty was not justified, then it shall fix the punishment at
life imprisonment...[and] that if the Commonwealth failed to prove either
predicate beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must impose life imprison-
ment." 41 No mention was made in the instructions of specific elements
of mitigation brought out by the defense.
The Client as Starting Point
When counsel meets with client for the first time, preparation for
the case in mitigation should begin. In the majority of cases, the best source
of information will be the client.
The following are some ideas that were offered by attorneys in
capital cases, and are a synopsis of techniques that have proved successful
in preventing clients from being sentenced to death. Counsel should know
that information gathered in preparation for the case in mitigation is useful
before the penalty trial. In fact, the information can be better employed
prior to trial, especially in negotiating a plea. Selective release of
information can convince a prosecutor not to pursue a capital conviction
before the jury is empaneled.
42
Elizabeth Murtagh is a criminal defense attorney in Lexington,
Virginia, and was formerly a public defender in Jacksonville, Florida. Ms.
Murtagh commences preparation for the mitigation case from the first
meeting with the client. She begins by informing the client that she is now
the lawyer for the case, and by explaining her position as an attorney from
the public defender's office or that she has been appointed by the court as
counsel. Unless the client desires to talk about the case, which is rare, she
then informs him of what she knows concerning the case. "Often, the client
looks to you to find out where to start with his story or how to talk to you.
You run the show, you're the lawyer, you are the one providing the
service." The introduction to the client is a vital opportunity because
capital defendants, like people everywhere, are strongly influenced by the
first impression. If the client begins with favorable impression of the
attorney, he will be much more likely to reveal the necessary information
needed for use in his mitigation case.
As the client begins to tell the facts of his case, Ms. Mutragh's
advises to listen carefully to the way he tells it. Active listening can lead
to insights about what the defendant thinks is important. These might not
be the legal facts important to the determination of guilt, but emphasis on
certain people, places or emotions may well provide clues to how the
defendant thinks and what kind of person he is, which are precisely the
elements needed to convince the jury not to execute him.
One subject that needs to be addressed early is the need for
mitigation evidence as it relates to the structure of the bifurcated trial.
Capital defendants may not understand why one wishes to prepare for the
penalty phase when the guilt phase has not even begun. Clients may
understandably lose confidence when asked to assist in preparing for a
proceeding that assumes a guilty verdict. Capital defendants may still
believe that they will be found not guilty, or that the Commonwealth really
will not seek the death penalty. One way of handling these problems and
still keeping the client's trust is to explain the timing of the bifurcated trial:
once the guilt phase is over, the penalty phase begins immediately, with the
samejurors and the samejudge. No time lag exists between the two phases
and that the mitigation evidence has to be ready to present at the outset.
Ms. Murtagh observes further that gathering mitigation evidence
is quite likely to take the attorney into places where the defendant either
grew up or spent much of his time. In most capital cases, the environment
is vastly different from what the attorney is accustomed to. Defendants'
homes are usually in poor areas, with the concomitant problem of crime.
Lawyers should not be averse to visiting the parental home or the home of
the defendant, however. Anxiety over these visits can be avoided simply
by going in the mid-morning and departing by the mid-afternoon. Also,
if the lawyer is going to interview, he can bring someone with him to be
a witness to the conversation. Sometimes, however, this may not be
appropriate. An example of when the attorney might be better advised to
go alone is when visiting the parents of the defendant. Parents might feel
ashamed at talking about their child, and if the attorney is alone, it may be
easier for them to communicate the facts of an often troubled childhood.
A visit to the parental home can be as revealing indirectly as
directly. For instance, photographs of siblings give clues to the way they
were, or what they are doing now. Mementos like sports trophies in the
home relate to good things that the defendant did or accomplished when
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he was younger. Just by observing the home, the attorney may be able to
gather useful mitigation evidence as to what kind of hurdles and barriers
the defendant faced at an early age. At the least, it will humanize the client
in the eyes of the lawyer, making it easier for the attorney to put the spirit
that is necessary into a successful mitigation defense. Additionally, seeing
parents and the home will give the lawyer something to talk about with the
client when they next meet, which in turn can open the door to further
mitigation evidence sources.
When interviewing potential mitigation witnesses, the lawyer
should keep in mind that the interviewee will be as apprehensive about the
interview as the attorney. The lawyer can use methods which defuse some
of the tension inherent in these meetings and open the door to meaningful
discussion about the client. One method facilitating the interview is not to
wear expensive clothes. Dress that is appropriate for the courtroom is not
necessarily clothing that is appropriate for the interview. The lawyer's aim
is not to emphasize the differences between the witness and the lawyer, but
to bridge that gap and communicate about what they have in common: a
concern for the defendant. Wear ordinary clothes.
Another method to which eases tension meetings is to accept an
offering of food or coffee. Ms. Murtagh's experience has been that it is the
rule rather than the exception that such an offer will be made. By accepting,
you alleviate the tension of having nothing in common and at the same time
it gives the witness a feeling of giving something back. This is the mindset
the attorney wants to foster, because the more at ease the witness is, the
more useful information surfaces.
Racial difference between counsel and the defendant and his peers,
whom the lawyer will encounter during the mitigation case investigation,
is a very sensitive and important issue.
In the case of black defendants, it is probable that many of their
prior experiences with whites have been negative. Most of the policemen
who have arrested them in the past will have been white, as well as their
judges and past lawyers. If counsel for the defendant's capital case is
white, a period of confidence building on behalf of the client must occur.
Similarly, if defendant is white and counsel is black, counsel may confront
ingrained racism.
Without confidence in his lawyer, the defendant will not be willing
to provide the information on mitigation issues vital to the ultimate success
of a capital trial. Explaining the attorney-client privilege can help build
trust, as can the honoring of time commitments by the lawyer. If the lawyer
tells the client that he will be at the jail to interview the client at a certain
time, it is crucial that the lawyer make the appointment on time. The lawyer
can inform the defendant that he has been to the prisoner's home or to his
parent's home, or discuss the defendant's family or children, which can
draw out the defendant through conversation relating to matters that are
important to him. The separation caused by incarceration from family,
spouse, children, girlfriend or boyfriend, may make the client more willing
to talk the lawyer, who then becomes a link to the outside world. By
increasing the level of communication, attorney and client can accelerate
the investigation of the mitigation case. These simple tactics can convince
the client that the lawyer is not impaired by racial or social differences and
will represent the client zealously.
Developing a Theory of Mitigation
Once the extensive legal research and even more extensive gath-
ering and investigation of mitigation information is complete, it is time for
the defense counsel to develop a theory of mitigation. A theory of
mitigation is the theme which the attorney will present to the jury during
the sentencing phase in an effort to convince at least one member that the
client does not deserve to die. A coherent theory of mitigation is absolutely
essential because that is the only thing which will counter the presumption
of death engendered in the mind of the jury by the prosecution's presen-
tation of evidence on vileness and future dangerousness, as well as the
crime itself. Counsel should not enter the g1ilt phase of trial without being
able to articulate an answer to the question "if the jury convicts of capital
murder, why should they not vote to kill my client?" 43 The prosecution is
handily provided with a theory for the penalty phase by the capital
sentencing statute. As mentioned above, the prosecution will urge that the
defendant committed a horrible, inhuman and vile act. Chances are that the
crime itself will lend some support to this theme. Thus, because the
prosecution has already won a capital conviction, half of the
Commonwealth's penalty phase is over. The prosecution will reinforce
the vileness factor with photographic evidence of the victim's remains,
which will be admitted into evidence even over defendant's objection.
Lastly, the prosecution will suggest to thejury that the defendant is a living
hazard to civilization and a menacing threat to society. This will be
accomplished by revealing to the jury all prior criminal acts, both adjudi-
cated and unadjudicated. Then, at the completion of the prosecution's
harrowing case, attention shifts to the defendant, who then is provided the
opportunity to "mitigate," or dilute, the effect of what has just been
presented sufficiently to save his life.
A primary element of a good theory of mitigation rests in the
concept that at this late stage of a capital trial, it is impossible to offer an
"excuse" for the defendant's acts. The jury already knows that no
justifiable excuse exists for what the defendant did. What the jury must be
made to understand is real life mitigation: why the defendant acted in the
manner that he did. This is where defense counsel presents the evidence
which has been gathered to the sentencer. All of the relatives, teachers,
physicians and acquaintances of the defendant that are available must tell
their story to thejury. In this way the jury will come to see a three-dimensional
picture of the defendant and his life. The jury will not be persuaded to forgive
the defendant, but they may be made to understand something about the
dynamics which brought the defendant to commit the crime.
Each theory should have a part that is stressed primarily, in order
that the jury can focus on an aspect of the defendant's character in
opposition to the elements that the prosecution has stressed. It may be
mental retardation, mental illness, social isolation orpoverty compounded
by years of substance abuse or sexual abuse. The key is that the jury be
given something to explain why the defendant was moved to murder.
Secondly, counsel must attempt to tie in the defendant's impair-
ment or struggle to the particular offense. This connects the background
mitigation evidence counsel presents to the jury with the crime, and helps
the jury understand the reason why this particular killing occurred the way
it did. This linking is absolutely essential to any hope of penalty phase
success. Mere presentation of good deeds, poverty, or abuse, without
establishing an explanatory relation to the offense, is not likely to work.
Infinite possibilities exist, but the identification of a connecting factor
between defendant and crime can make the jury more likely to sentence the
defendant to life.
A sub-theme that must underlie the entire case in mitigation is that
of reducing the fear and revulsion that thejurors feel toward the defendant.
This is done not only by carefully and systematically presenting them with
evidence about the defendant, his mental and physical environment, but
also through the way his defense team reacts with the defendant. 4 It is easy
to forget that the jury can see the defendant during the course of the entire
trial. The way in which counsel and even court officials deal with the
defendant will influence the jury in their perceptions of the defendant. 45 It
is beneficial to have two attorneys if possible, one to handle the guilt phase
and one to present the mitigation. Also helpful is to have clerks or other
members of the defense team visible around and communicating with the
defendant. 46 This stresses the concept that the defendant is not so horrible
that he cannot be communicated with by other people. How the police and
bailiff react to the client is similarly important. The more relaxed they are,
the better the jury will feel about sentencing life instead of death. The fear
generated by hostile bailiffs and courtroom guards can be great, with the
predictable result that the jury will be further alarmed and tempted to
execute the defendant.47 The defendant's appearance should also be made
as presentable as possible, if only for the reason that it may induce the
courtroom officials to behave more favorably to the defendant. The
defense attorneys can influence everyone's attitude toward the client
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simply by communicating with the client often, which underscores the fact
that the defendant, irrespective of the crime he has been convicted of, talks
and listens as do other members of society.
48
A Case Study
An example of the kind of mitigation case that does not work can
be found in the case of Commonwealth v. Strickler.49 The case demon-
strates several failures of mitigation presentation discussed in the sections
above, and illustrates by omission and also by suggestion techniques
which counsel might betteremploy when presenting the case in mitigation.
The first witness that the defense attorney called in the penalty
phase was a psychiatrist. 50 The attorney asked the psychiatrist standard
questions as to qualification. He elicited from the doctor that he had
conducted intelligence quotient tests on the defendant.
Q: And have you had the opportunity to do, [sic] give such a test
to Tommy Strickler?
A: Yes I have...
Q: And do you remember what the results of that test were?
A: Yes I do.
Q: What were they?
A: He received a full scale IQ of seventy-five...
Q: What does that mean in terms of his range?
A: A full scale IQ of seventy-five places his intellectual
functioning in a borderline range. The borderline range is between
mentally retarded and the low average range.
51
Following this, the defense attorney elicited testimony that the
defendant was in the 95th percentile of intelligence, or in other words that
95% of his age group were more intelligent than he. Next, the attorney
attempted to develop testimony that the tests would indicate that the
defendant would have an impaired decisionmaking process as a result of
his mental impairment. This tack was unsuccessful, and the examination
concluded on the topic ofwhat the methods of testing were, butthe attorney
could not get the doctor to state that the defendant would have had decision
making impairment.
52
After an exchange that brought out only that the defendant was in
a borderline retarded decisionmaking level, the direct concluded and the
prosecution cross examined.
Q: [The defendant] is able to function though with this low
intelligence?
A: It depends on what you mean by function
Q: O.K. He knows the difference between right and wrong, does
he not?
A: That is correct.
Q: He knows the consequences of his acts, does he not?
A: I believe, yes.
53
That concluded the examination of the first defense witness in the
penalty phase. Several problems with this witness are visible from
examination of the transcript. The first is that the doctor was not examined
in sufficient detail. As an examining physician of the defendant, he
potentially provided the chance to humanize the defendant to thejury. The
defense could have, at a minimum, developed testimony exactly on how
the defendant performed during the tests. The doctor could have been
asked to describe in detail the efforts of the defendant in taking a test he
apparently could barely comprehend. The jury, then, could have been
given an insight into the difficulties of being mentally retarded. If the
defendant tried hard on the test, made efforts to please the doctor or the
staff, that information should have been brought out as well. This sort of
evidence might have been useful even if the doctor were not willing to give
a conclusion that one in the lower five percent intellectually suffered from
impaired decision making.
Defense attorneys must be aware that the questions asked by the
prosecutors on capacity are standard, and deprive them of the best chance
they have with defendant's doctors. If the defense attorney had elicited the
functional impairment of the defendant, and underscored it with specific
information, the prosecutor might have been denied any use from the
doctor, and the jury would have been introduced to the concept that the
mitigation case is more complex than a search for an excuse for the killing.
Another way of attacking these standard questions might be to object on
grounds ofrelevancy. Because theprosecutor's question really went to the
issue of sanity, it was relevant to the guilt phase, but not the sentencing
phase.
The next two witnesses defense called were a woman and a man
who knew the defendant only slightly. Virtually no personal information
relating to the mitigating elements of the defendant's personality were
developed from either.54 Defense counsel must focus the penalty phase on
the presentation of the defendant's life story. Temptations to stray from the
structure of the mitigation theory should be resisted, and testimony or
witnesses that are irrelevant should be omitted.
There was stipulated testimony from a former employer that
defendant was a good and regular worker until an automobile accident
forced him to give up the job.55 If at all possible, positive testimony of this
typeshould be elicited by in-person witnesses. It humanizes the defendant,
and shows that at least at one point in his life, he was valued to some extent
and had characteristics that the jury can relate to. It is important to bring in
people who are not afraid of the defendant as well, as this alleviates the fear
emotion that makes up part of the jury's decision vote to kill the client.
Additionally, whenever testimony alludes to a serious accident,
counsel should research this and see if neurological orbrain damage might
have resulted, as many capital defendants suffer from these ailments. The
damage, in turn, may be shown to have influenced the commission of the
murder. This is an example of how an impairment can be "linked" to the
crime. Any reason which can explain the conduct of the defendant is going
to help his chances for life.
The next witness was potentially very helpful to the defendant's
case in mitigation. The attorney called the defendant's older sister.56 She
testified that Strickler's father left the family home when the boy was two
years old, and that thereafter had no contact with him. The fatherdied when
the defendant was ten. The sister testified that it was "pretty tough on us
all." The sister testified further that the mother remarried, and that from
the outset the relationship with the son was very poor. She testified that the
boy became involved with drugs at an early age. She testified that Strickler
had talked to her and "other people" about his difficulties. Then, testimony
was introduced that Strickler went to live with his sister during his high
school years, but that he could not perform in school, and kept getting into
trouble. Although the sister tried to help, her efforts failed. The sister
strenuously asserted that her brother is a good person but that he has a
problem. After this point, the witness broke down and was dismissed.
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This testimony was good to bring out because it was from a lay
witness who was close to the defendant, telling the life story. This witness
might have been utilized to even greater effectiveness with some more
planning and preparation. Her testimony pointed the way to several areas
that provide good mitigation evidence. The first was absence of parental
guidance, the second poverty. The testimony alluded to possible child-
abuse and the early involvement with drugs. Any one of these factors could
have had a detrimental affect on the defendant's mental and moral
development. Family witnesses can be effectively utilized, especially
when they can detail how the family environment, which is supposed to
nurture and train the child, was dysfunctional and failed the defendant so
egregiously, that even if only tangentially, their failure may have been a
contributing factor related to the commission of the crime. The sister
would appear from her testimony to have been well suited to that kind of
"life story" revelation. She was obviously in great distress over the plight
of herbrother, and so might have been willing to reveal the details of family
life to the sentencer. Narrative on the impact of early drug involvement can
be helpful to the case as well, especially if it can be demonstrated that
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family members knew or encouraged the abuse but did not intervene.
Assuming the risks inherent in speculation, mostjurors are presumably not
observing the client with a true understanding of the turmoil which is an
unrelenting part of youth without guidance, with abuse, and with drug use.
These are elements of the defendant's life that are going to have to made
very real to the sentencer, and often family members are the best ones to
do it, because they were present and may even have had a hand in the abuse.
Unless the witness truly cannot or will not continue with her
narrative, it is not in the best interests of the client to dismiss the witness.
The preferred tactic would have been to request a recess until the witness
calmed down, or recall the witness at a later time to continue with her
testimony. Although a witness may have fruitful information, it can not be
capitalized upon unless brought out in full.
The penultimate witness for the defense was a neighbor.58 Again,
this witness was potentially very helpful because he testified that Strickler
always seemed to be a good person and that he was a good neighbor. He
told the sentencer that Strickler had helped him build an addition to his
home, was honest and that the relationship he had with the defendant was
healthy and normal.59 This type of witness can be very helpful for several
reasons. One, it shows that the defendant is not some fearsome creature
that is shunned by all; testimony from neighbors is helpful in this regard
because a neighbor is likely to be perceived as unbiased. Second,
testimony of this type gives the jury a chance to see times when the
defendant was able to prevail against the negative aspects of his life, and
that there are pieces of his past that affirm his value as a person and his
worthiness to live, albeit in prison. Perhaps most importantly, neighbors'
testimony gives the jury a chance to see that not everyone is frightened of
the defendant. This is necessary because the capital sentencer is statutorily
directed to consider the fear factor, in the guise of the future dangerousness
prong of many capital statutes and in the Virginia capital jury instructions.
Finally, the testimony of neighbors can be valuable in corroborating other
witness' testimony concerning the turbulence or violence in the parent's
home. This in turn will strengthen the defendant's case because jurors may
conclude that the circumstances in the home must have been severe, if even
the neighbors were aware of the problems.
The final witness called was the defendant's mother.60 The mother
testified that the defendant's father left when defendant was two, and that
she had to provide for the two sisters as well. She testified that the
defendant's father did farm work and worked in a service station. She
described doing odd jobs for a living. She then told how when she
remarried, life became even more difficult because her second husband
was "mean." She also said that the entire family had "a rough time," and
that eventually Strickler was thrown out of the house. She told further how,
as a young boy, the defendant could not stay in the house, and had to make
do as best he could living in a variety of different places. For a time,
Strickler lived in some kind of shed in the back of his mother's house, but
his stepfather would not leave him alone there either. The stepfather's
antipathy for the defendant was so severe that he forbade the mother from
giving him money to eat or ever letting him in the house. Sometimes the
defendant had nowhere to sleep except his mother's automobile. Her
evidence concluded with a supposition that there would be "pure hell"
when she returned home in retribution for testifying on behalf of her son.
She also stated that her son never reacted violently to the abuse, but just
asked his mother how she could take the treatment and told her that he
would leave.6
1
The mother's testimony raises several areas of inquiry. One is the
issue of abuse. There was never any direct testimony as to the precise
nature of the abuse. That it must have been severe seems obvious, and more
detailed questioning might have revealed insights into the defendant's life
that could have shown the sentencer what it was actually like trying to
survive in the environment created by his stepfather. The mother's
testimony could have provided the central buttress of a theory of mitiga-
tion. A workable theory could have been that the defendant was a victim
of abuse, had a long history of suffering from physical, emotional and
economic privation and had extreme amounts of pent up rage within him;
that acts of violence, shocking to most people, were part of the fabric of his
daily life. The theory could focus on how at almost every stage of his young
life, the defendant had been failed by the people whom he relied on most.
This theory, a variation of the "minimum shared responsibility" method,
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might have been sufficient to militate in favor of a life sentence to a capital
conviction. At a minimum, the testimony pointed to a number of
individuals who had an affect on Strickler's life: relatives who housed him,
teachers, his stepfather. Although the mother's testimony implies a
sorrowful youth, it fails in the crucial task of providing a reason why the
defendant did the crime.
The record indicates that one attorney handled both the guilt and
penalty phases of the trial. It is better to have separate attorneys argue the
different phases of the trial for several reasons. The first is based on the
assumption that the jury will have an easier time believing the mitigation
evidence if it is presented by someone who has not spent the last few days
arguing that the defendant is not guilty of the crime they just convicted him
of committing. The second is the element of preparation. The guilt phase
attorney may not have sufficient morale to argue strenuously for the
defendant after just losing the guilt phase, which is something the jury is
sure to sense. Also, factors of the guilt phase may dictate changes in the
method best employed at the penalty phase, and the arguing attorney may
not be able to concentrate on all these issues simultaneously.
The Commonwealth, to use Strickler as an example, relied prima-
rily on the gruesomeness of the crime itself to argue for the death penalty.
Often times the Commonwealth will have only the criminal record and the
evidence of the crime the defendant has just been found guilty of. In
contrast, the defendant has whatever persons he can find from his past, any
good deeds he has done, any relationships with family or friends, or jobs,
to argue in favor of his being given the chance to live inside the confines
of the prison for the remainder of his life. Looked at from another
perspective, if the defendant arguendo is going to spend a substantial time
in prison for the crime (be it twenty-five or thirty years), the difference is
still qualitatively greater between life imprisonment and death than
between life imprisonment and acquittal. Therefore, if looked at dispas-
sionately in terms only of probability and finality of result, the penalty
phase, from the defendant's point of view, should be as lengthy and as
substantial as the preparations for the guilt phase, if not more so.
Conclusion
The interrelation between the law, both state and federal, and the
facts of the client's case and how they are presented, is in sum what is
known as the case in mitigation. Although overall mitigation is consider-
ably complex, it has as an advantage many elements drawn from common
sense and simple observation. This is logical because mitigation incorpo-
rates both addressing the defendant as an individual, and then conveying
that individuality to twelve jurors who sit in judgement. If this effort
succeeds against the aggravating factors the prosecution presents, the
client will not be sentenced to death. What is most important for counsel
to accept about the penalty phase and mitigation is simply this: it is the
defendant's time, not the prosecution's, and counsel's diligence and
dedication here will yield either success, in the form of a life sentence, or
if the final phase of the capital trial is insufficiently presented, the most
severe penalty our law demands.
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